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ABSTRACT: Instability occurs when the very fact of choosing one particular 
possible option rather than another affects the expected values of those possible 
options. In decision theory: An act is stable iff given that it is actually performed, 
its expected utility is maximal. When there is no stable choice available, the 
resulting instability can seem to pose a dilemma of practical rationality. A 
structurally very similar kind of instability, which occurs in cases of anti-expertise, 
can likewise seem to create dilemmas of epistemic rationality. One possible line 
of response to such cases of instability, suggested by both Jeffrey (1983) and 
Sorensen (1987), is to insist that a rational agent can simply refuse to accept that 
such instability applies to herself in the first place. According to this line of thought 
it can be rational for a subject to discount even very strong empirical evidence 
that the anti-expertise condition obtains. I present a new variety of anti-expertise 
condition where no particular empirical stage-setting is required, since the subject 
can deduce a priori that an anti-expertise condition obtains. This kind of anti-




1. Introduction: Instability and Anti-Expertise 
 
Instability is the general phenomenon that occurs when the very fact of choosing one 
particular possible option rather than another affects the expected values of those possible 
options. Such instability can crop up both when we are considering which action to perform 
and also when we are considering what to believe – so the affected values in question could 
either be utilities or truth-values (accuracy). The aim for this paper is to present a new case of 
instability of the latter kind, concerning whether or not to believe a proposition, one which 
creates, I will suggest, a novel kind of ‘anti-expertise’ dilemma for epistemic rationality. 
However, since the former kind of instability, concerning the expected utility of different 
possible actions, has been much more frequently discussed, let’s begin by very briefly 
rehearsing one of the best-known examples in the decision theory literature: Gibbard & 
Harper’s (1978) classic ‘Death in Damascus’ case1.  
                                                      
1 “Death works from an appointment book which states time and place; a person dies if and only if the 
book correctly states in what city he will be at the stated time. The book is made up weeks in advance 
on the basis of highly reliable predictions. An appointment on the next day has been inscribed for him. 
Suppose, on this basis, the man would take his being in Damascus the next day as strong evidence that 
his appointment with Death is in Damascus, and would take his being in Aleppo the next day as strong 
evidence that his appointment is in Aleppo... If... he decides to go to Aleppo, he then has strong grounds 
for expecting that Aleppo is where Death already expects him to be, and hence it is rational for him to 
prefer staying in Damascus. Similarly, deciding to stay in Damascus would give him strong grounds for 




The subject’s dilemma in this case is that: if S actually chooses to go to Aleppo then Death 
will be in Aleppo and so S prefers to be in Damascus, but, if S actually chooses to go to 
Damascus then Death will be in Damascus and so S prefers to be in Aleppo. Moreover, S can 
know in advance that this will be the case. Assuming that the subject has normal awareness of 
her own choices, the very act of choosing one option will provide evidence that that option is 
not optimal. If we are thinking in terms of utility, we can define stability as follows2:  
 
An act is stably preferred iff its expected utility remains maximal once the decision to 
perform that act has actually been taken. 
 
So Death in Damascus is an unstable case as there is no stable option available – the decision 
to do one thing makes the other preferable. To put this in a slightly different way, in Death in 
Damascus the subject, S, has extremely strong evidence that the following bi-conditional 
holds: 
 
• (DD) S Chooses φ ↔ φ does not maximize utility for S. 
 
Clearly this bi-conditional will be made true, uninterestingly, whenever a subject happens by 
mistake to choose some option φ that does not maximize utility or fails to choose some option 
φ that does maximize utility – e.g. through poor decision making or inattention, etc. But the 
point, of course, is that in Death in Damascus this bi-conditional will obtain no matter what 
the subject chooses to do. (And the subject knows this beforehand.) 
 
One possible response to a possible scenario in which DD is supposed to hold is simply to 
accept that it is a genuine dilemma of practical rationality – whatever the subject chooses, she 
will end up being rationally sub-optimal. A different kind of response is to deny that it is 
genuinely possible for such a situation to even arise (for a rational agent). Or at least, to deny 
that a rational agent could rationally believe that they themselves are in such a situation 
where DD applies to them. This was the suggestion made, in passing, by Richard Jeffrey in 
the second edition of his ‘The Logic of Decision’ (1983) where he claims that such a situation 
could only appear to arise due to the subject’s faulty beliefs or incoherent desires, advising 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
2 One might alternatively define stability in terms of conditional expected value: an option is stably 
preferred iff its expected utility conditional on its actually being chosen is maximal. I am very grateful 
to an anonymous referee for helpful comments on defining stability. 
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‘you do well to reassess your beliefs and desires before choosing’ (p19)3. We will return to 
this sort of response in section 2, below. 
 
Death in Damascus and similar instability cases have generated an enormous decision-
theoretic literature. But the focus for this paper is a structurally similar kind of ‘unstable’ 
situation, which occurs in so-called ‘Anti-Expertise’ cases (see, e.g., Conee 1982, Sorensen 
1987, Egan & Elga 2005, Christensen 2007, Bommarito 2010). 
 
“I’m a neurologist, and know there’s a device that has been shown to induce the 
following state in people: they believe that their brains are in state S iff their brains are 
not in state S. I watch many trials with the device, and become extremely confident that 
it’s extremely reliable. I’m also confident that my brain is not in state S. Then the device 
is placed on my head and switched on. My confidence that my brain is not in state S..... 
well, it’s not clear here what should happen here.” (Christensen 2010, drawn from 
Conee 1982) 
 
In this anti-expertise case, the subject, S, has extremely good empirical evidence that, for 
some particular proposition, p, the following bi-conditional holds4: 
 
• (AE) S Believes that p ↔ ¬p 
 
Again, this bi-conditional will, trivially, happen to be made true whenever the subject 
happens to believe a falsehood or happens not to believe some truth. But in an anti-expertise 
case, the bi-conditional will hold whether or not the subject believes the proposition in 
question (i.e. whatever doxastic state the subject chooses with respect to p). Moreover, as 
with Death in Damascus, the subject in such an Anti-Expertise case can know in advance that 
whether she believes p or not, having formed one doxastic state, the other doxastic state is 
bound to be more accurate/less inaccurate. Anti-Expertise cases might thus be thought to pose 
a genuine dilemma of epistemic rationality. I trust that the similarity between the bi-
conditionals AE and DD is clear enough. But let’s now briefly consider three points of 
dissimilarity between the sort of Anti-Expertise case that Conee and Christensen are 
considering and the Death in Damascus case. 
                                                      
3 Notice that strictly speaking, according to Jeffrey’s own official view, there are no such things as 
outright or full beliefs – we should eliminate such talk and replace it with subjective probabilities. 
4 A different condition that is also sometimes labeled ‘anti-expertise’ is when: (Bp à ¬p) & (B¬p à 
p). I.e. if you believe it, it’s false, if you disbelieve it, it’s true. Notice that this condition creates less 
threat of a dilemma insofar as it says nothing about suspending judgement or simply neither believing 
nor disbelieving that p. The bi-conditional AE, in contrast, states that: (Bp à ¬p) & (¬Bp à p). 
 4 
 
(i) As Conee sets his anti-expertise case up there is causal influence involved. The fictional 
device is supposed to induce the anti-expertise condition: i.e. there is some kind of causal 
relation between the subject forming a certain belief and the operations of the machine. In 
contrast, the figure of Death, in Death in Damascus, is neither causally influencing nor 
causally responsive to the subject’s actual choice. The idea is that Death is just a fantastic 
predictor of what the subject’s decision will (very probably) be. 
 
(ii) A second point of difference is that it is plausible that one cannot simply choose what to 
believe in the way that one can just choose to go to Damascus or to Aleppo – this is the thesis 
of doxastic involuntarism. The precise sense in which we can and cannot voluntarily 
influence our own beliefs is very tricky to spell out precisely – but there is clearly some 
important sense in which belief formation is very different from forming a decision to act, and 
this difference turns on the fact that our beliefs (unlike our intentions and desires etc) are 
somehow essentially constrained and determined by our evidence. As it is sometimes put: 
‘belief is transparent to the truth’.  
 
(iii) Thirdly, and most importantly for present purposes, unlike Death in Damascus where it is 
stipulated that there are only two possible choices – Aleppo or Damascus – in the Anti-
Expertise case there is a third option: one can believe, one can disbelieve or one can suspend 
judgement. In other words the option of not believing that p sub-divides into two importantly 
different options – outright disbelief or mere suspension (lack of belief). 
 
The reason that this last dissimilarity is especially important is that Conee himself thought 
that the rational (or least irrational) option for a subject in the anti-expertise case who accepts 
(AE) is to suspend judgement. Just to spell this out a little more explicitly: Conee assumes 
that the subject can suspend whether p and then also know that she does not currently believe 




But of course given that she accepts the biconditional (AE), she is in a position to know that 
her lack of belief entails that p is true: 
 
K(¬Bp → p) 
 
 5 
So she knows, or justifiably believes, all the premises she needs in order to go ahead and 
perform the simplest of modus ponens inferences to the conclusion that p. But of course if she 
did go ahead and conclude that p, then should would believe that p which would mean, by 
(AE), that p is false and so we would be set back off on our vicious circle. 
 
Conee suggests that at this point the subject can permissibly refrain from drawing this 
obvious, modus ponens of an inference (despite knowing both premises) and instead just 
continue to suspend judgement whether p5. So Conee here denies that Knowledge (or even 
justified Belief) is closed under known entailment.  
 
2. Sorensen’s response to Anti-Expertise 
 
Roy Sorensen (1987) was not satisfied with this sort of response to the anti-expertise case, 
levelling two related criticisms at Conee’s proposal: 
 
(i) Sorensen claims that it would be a ‘low account of rationality’, which allows a subject to 
suspend judgement on a proposition even when she grasps that her own evidence/beliefs 
entail that the proposition is true. In other words, it cannot always be rational to suspend 
judgement no matter how strong your evidence; there must come a point when such epistemic 
caution becomes irrational and surely this kind of transparently obvious modus ponens 
inference is about as clear a case as one could possibly have where the evidence rationally 
calls for belief rather than suspension. 
 
(ii) Sorensen also suggests that when a perfectly rational and attentive subject fully believes 
and explicitly grasps the premises of a simple modus ponens like this, the subject will thereby 
automatically accept the conclusion (unless of course she already disbelieves the conclusion.) 
In other words, Sorensen claims that at least for an ideally rational, attentive etc. thinker, 
belief is closed under known entailment: [Kp & K(p → q)] →  Bq 
 
Now of course this second criticism will be controversial given that a number of 
epistemologists have denied such closure principles. And I suspect that there may be some 
philosophers who would want to resist the first criticism. After all, the ancient Pyrrhonians 
apparently advised people to suspend judgement about everything – though of course if they 
were to positively believe or judge that: one ought to suspend judgement about everything, 
                                                      
5 Reed Richter (1990) likewise argues that it can be rationally permitted to not believe the deductive 
consequences of your beliefs, even if you know and grasp that they have these consequences. 
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then they would have failed to follow their own advice to suspend judgement about 
everything! But for present purposes we need not evaluate how telling Sorensen’s criticisms 
of Conee are. 
 
Instead I want to focus on Sorensen’s positive alternative suggestion, which is that the 
rational thing for the subject to do in a putative case of anti-expertise is to refuse to believe 
that the anti-expertise condition really does apply in the first place, no matter how strong the 
empirical evidence that it does. In particular, Sorensen makes the claim that no conceivable 
empirical evidence could be strong enough to make belief in (AE) rational, as believing (AE) 
would then either snare one in a vicious loop/regress, or require one to flout basic principles 
of rationality such as following through to the conclusion in manifest cases of Modus Ponens. 
Likewise Sorensen claims that in Death in Damascus no amount of ‘empirical evidence’ (note 
empirical!) could rationally convince the subject that if she chooses Aleppo then death will be 
in Aleppo and if she chooses Damascus then death will be in Damascus. Sorensen then is 
effectively endorsing Jeffrey’s suggestion for the Death in Damascus case – that we should 
reject that we really are in a case where the bi-conditional holds – and extending the 
suggestion to the Anti-Expertise case as well. Sorensen comments: 
 
‘Since we are warranted in making costly revisions to our background assumptions to 
escape acceptance of an inconsistent proposition, we are also justified in paying a high 
price to avoid positions which cannot be consistently accepted.’ (Sorensen, 1987, 312) 
 
According to Sorensen then we have here something like what Titelbaum (2015) has more 
recently called a “fixed point of rationality” – a proposition which no amount of supporting 
evidence can make it rational to believe6. Sorensen himself calls these ‘over-shadowed 
hypotheses’ as no matter what the evidence, these hypotheses will always be over-shadowed 
by some other hypothesis – i.e. the evidence will always make it more rational to believe 
something else. Sorensen provides examples of other supposedly over-shadowed hypotheses: 
 
I don’t currently exist. 
I have no evidence about anything. 
The successor of largest number ever conceived is 9874534244523453. 
                                                      
6 Sorensen does allow that in light of new evidence one could increase one’s confidence that one is an 
anti-expert from a low credence to a less low credence, so long as one does not actually (outright) 
believe that one is an anti-expert. Likewise he allows that one can permissibly believe that one might 
be an anti-expert. So Sorensen does allow for some limited sensitivity to evidence in favour of one’s 
being an anti-expert. Many thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for helpful comments on 
this point. 
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Its raining and I don’t believe that its raining7. 
 
These are what Sorensen (1988) memorably called “Blindspots”. A blindspot is a proposition 
that can be true but which cannot be both true and believed. Again the idea is that no matter 
how much empirical evidence we have that such a proposition is true, it cannot be rational for 
me to go ahead and believe it. It will always be more rational to believe something else. E.g. 
even if I can both see and feel the rain and see a brain scanning device with an amazing track 
record of reliability which says that I do not believe that its raining, still this would not 
rationalise my believing the blindspot. It would, according to Sorensen, always be more 
rational to either believe that I am hallucinating the rain, or that the brain-scanner is 
malfunctioning, etc. 
 
Notice: with some blindspot propositions, just by considering their meaning we can deduce 
that the following condition holds: 
 
SB(p) → ¬p 
 
E.g. we can tell a priori just from the content of the blindspot proposition: ‘It’s raining and I 
don’t believe that it’s raining’ that one direction – the left-hand to right-hand direction – of 
(AE) holds. If I believe that: [Its raining and I don’t believe that its raining], then this belief is 
bound to be false. But of course the other direction of the bi-conditional is not guaranteed to 
hold just because of the content of such a Blindspot: 
 




 ¬SB(p) → p 
 
Just because such a blindspot proposition is false, that would not entail that I believe it! Nor, 
equivalently, does my lack of belief entail that the blindspot is true. 
 
 
                                                      
7 This last sentence is, of course, an instance what we now call (following Wittgenstein 1953, part II, 
section x) ‘Moore’s paradox’. Moore’s original sentence was: ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I 
don’t believe that I did.’ (Moore, 1942, 543), which is of the form: p & ¬Bp. Sentences of the form: p 
& B¬p, or: Bp & ¬p, are also standardly counted as ‘Moorean’. 
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3. Deducing that an anti-expertise condition obtains 
 
In this section I will argue that (what we might call) the Sorensen-Jeffrey line of response to 
(putative) cases of Anti-Expertise instability – that one can always rationally reject the 
evidence that an anti-expertise condition really does apply to oneself – will not always work. 
The problem is that whilst the sort of cases Sorensen considers, and which have mostly been 
discussed8, are situations in which we get merely very strong empirical evidence that we are 
subject to an anti-expertise condition, it is also possible to deductively infer that a kind of 
anti-expertise condition holds, simply by considering a certain kind of possible thought or 
judgement. As we will see, this anti-expertise condition does not quite fit the simple schema 
of (AE): S Believes that p ↔ ¬p. Rather, by considering a particular kind of possible 
demonstrative judgement, the subject can deduce that in her current situation she in an 
unstable position concerning whether to believe a particular proposition. And whilst that 
specific proposition might be truly believable in a different situation, there would then be a 
different proposition for which she is in just the same kind of unstable position. 
 
Before we consider the kind of possible judgement that leads to this instability, it will be 
helpful if we first consider a different but related possible thought: 
 
q: I am currently in this total mental state. 
 
The English sentence I have written here to express the thought in question contains a 
demonstrative term ‘this’, the temporal indexical ‘currently’ and also the 1st-person indexical 
‘I’, so of course this same English sentence type can be used to express indefinitely many 
different propositions on different occasions of use. But the same proposition [at least on one 
way of individuating propositions] that would get expressed or believed on some particular 
occasion of stating or judging this sentence type – e.g. that Selma is in a particular total 
mental state at a particular time – might alternatively be stated or judged using some other, 
non-indexical form. We could eliminate indexical expressions if we stipulate that ‘M’ picks 
out the total mental state that Selma is in at time t.  So if, at time t, Selma believes “Selma is 
in M at time t”, this total mental state M thus includes, amongst all of Selma’s other beliefs 
and desires etc., the very belief that ‘Selma is in M at t’. This would be an alternative, albeit 
much less natural, way for a subject to believe the same proposition that would be more 
                                                      
8 Compare for example, Koons (1990), who presents a pair of ‘Doxastic Paradoxes” that do not rely on 
self-reference. But the set-up of these situations does still rely on the subject somehow having 
extremely strong empirical evidence that a bi-conditional of the form: p ↔ S cannot justifiably Bp, 
really does apply to her. 
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naturally expressed using the sentence ‘I am currently in this total mental state’. Either way it 
would be a belief about one’s own total current mental state including all one’s beliefs and 
judgements. And so the total mental state that I am thereby thinking about when I form the 
belief that q includes that very mental attitude of believing q: ‘I am in this total mental state’. 
 
To judge that q, in this demonstrative format, is bound to be true – it is a bit like judging: ‘I 
am this tall’ whilst demonstrating the top of one’s own head9, or “I am currently located 
here’, or “it is currently now”, etc. Of course, the proposition that the subject judges in these 
kinds of cases – e.g. that Selma is currently 1.7 metres tall – is not a necessary truth. There 
are possible worlds where Selma is some other height and so where Selma would judge 
falsely that she is 1.7 metres tall. But given that Selma formed her judgement in a 
distinctively demonstrative way that is bound to refer to her actual height, or to her actual 
total mental state, the judgement is bound to be true in the actual world – she is bound to be in 
this total mental state, just as she is bound to be this tall. 
 
Now that we are familiar with making this kind of demonstrative judgement about one’s own 
current total mental state, lets turn to considering the following different possible kind of 
demonstrative thought. 
 
p: I am not in this total current mental state. 
 
In contrast to q, if you form a belief that p, you believe that you are not in this current total 
mental state, where the demonstrative ‘this’ is now picking out a total mental state which 
includes that very belief p: ‘I am not in this total current mental state.’ Notice therefore that 
what would be believed if one formed a belief that p is not the negation of what would be 
                                                      
9 Wittgenstein (1953) very briefly mentions this sort of demonstrative judgement of one’s own height 
in section §279 of the Investigations, in the course of what is generally considered to be his ‘private 
language argument’: ‘Imagine someone saying: "But I know how tall I am!" and laying his hand on top 
of his head to prove it.’ One might naturally read Wittgenstein here as dismissing such a claim and/or 
demonstration as meaningless. However, in the immediately preceding section §278 he writes: ‘"I 
know how the colour green looks to me"—surely that makes sense!—Certainly: what use of the 
proposition are you thinking of?’ Assuming that in the last sentence here Wittgenstein is speaking in 
propria persona, his point then seems to be not so much that such statements are simply meaningless, 
but rather just that we should ask what the point or usage of such statements is supposed to be in any 
given context. But setting aside matters of Wittgensteinian interpretation, one possible objection would 
be to claim that these kinds of demonstrative judgements are meaningless, hence fail to be true. Let me 
just state that this strikes me as highly implausible. If someone were to point at the ground beneath 
their feet and assert “I am located here!” we may wonder what the point of the assertion is, but there 
seems no basis whatsoever for denying that they have uttered a perfectly well-formed English sentence, 
expressing a perfectly meaningful claim that is, trivially, true. Many thanks to an anonymous referee 
for interesting and helpful discussion on this point. 
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believed if one instead formed the belief that q, because the demonstrative ‘this’ would be 
picking out a different total mental state in each case.  
 
As with q, above, the same proposition that is expressed, in some specific context, by the 
sentence p: “I am not in this total current mental state”, could also be expressed in non-
indexical fashion. Let’s now stipulate that: ‘M*’ refers to Selma’s total mental state at t. And 
let’s also suppose that at t Selma judges that “Selma is not in M* at t”. The total mental state 
M* would thus include, along with all sorts of other beliefs and desires etc., the belief that 
‘Selma is not in M* at t”.  
 
A judgement that p: “I am not in this total mental state”, formed in this demonstrative fashion, 
is bound to be false – it’s a bit like judging: ‘I am not this height’ whilst demonstrating the 
top of your own head. Again, that is not to say that the proposition that gets judged is a 
necessary falsehood – there are possible worlds in which it is true that Selma is not 1.7 m tall 
just as there are possible worlds in which it is true that Selma is not in total mental state M* at 
time t. But given the demonstrative way in which these judgements are made, they are bound 
to be (actually) false. Whereas if S forms the non-indexical judgement: ‘S is not in M* at t’ 
then this judgement is only guaranteed to be false if it is made at t – which is not something 
that a subject can tell just by reflection. Moreover, S might not know which total mental state 
the label ‘M*’ refers to, or even which person the name ‘S’ refers to. It is the indexical form 
of the judgement: I am not in this total current mental state, which ensures that the time at 
which the judgement is made and the time that the judgement is about are the same (and also 
that the person making the judgement is the same as the person that the judgement is about). 
And given that the subject mentally attends to her own current mental state in order to fix the 
reference of the phrase ‘this total current mental state’, there can be no doubt which mental 
state is in question. This illustrates the familiar point that sometimes a subject can know just 
by reflection (a priori as it were) that a proposition is true/false when it is expressed as a 
certain kind of demonstrative judgement, and yet the same proposition when expressed in 
non-indexical terms might not be knowable to be true/false10.  
 
Now consider that: if, at time t, S does not believe the proposition “S is not in M* at t”, this 
proposition must be true – since the total mental state ‘M* would include a belief in the 
proposition “S is not in M* at t”. So if, at time t, S does not believe this proposition then it is 
                                                      
10 E.g. I can know by reflection that “I exist right now”, whereas I might not be able to know just by 
reflection that “N exists at time t”. One might dispute whether the former sort of knowledge should 
really count as a priori since it plausibly relies on the subject’s self-conscious experience of her own 
mental life, but it seems clear at least that it does not rely on any empirical evidence about the external 
world and so is something that can be known just ‘by reflection’. 
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true – S is not in M* at t. And so we have the following situation: when S is merely 
contemplating forming a belief “I am not in this total mental state” at some point in the future, 
she is in a position to grasp that the proposition that would thereby be believed must be true at 
t if S does not believe it at t. Notice that this marks a difference from demonstrative 
judgements such as: “I am not this height” (demonstrating the top of one’s own head), or “I 
am not here” (demonstrating one’s current location), for when we merely contemplate 
making these latter judgements it is clear that the propositions they would express will 
(typically) be false whether or not one believes them. E.g. as one merely contemplates the 
judgement ‘I am not currently this height’ one can see that the proposition it would express 
would be false if the judgement were actually made but would also be false if the judgement 
is not actually formed (unless the very act of actually making/not-making this judgement 
could somehow thereby change one’s height!).  
 
But S is also in a position to grasp just by reflection that if, at time t, she were to go ahead and 
actually form the judgement “I am not in this total mental state”, that proposition judged 
would then be false. So this is a situation where the subject can deduce just by reflection that 
a kind of instability obtains concerning what to believe – i.e. the threat of instability here is 
not based on any empirical evidence about a brain scanning device or an omniscient 
predictor, etc. Notice also that were the subject to actually form the judgement “I am not in 
this total mental state” and so come to believe the (false) proposition “S is not in M* at t”, this 
would not simply be an instance of a subject having a false belief about her own state of mind 
– as, say, a subject with implicit or unconsciously racist attitudes might wrongly believe “I 
am not racist”. Forming a belief “I am not racist” does not thereby make one racist, nor would 
the absence of such a belief ensure that one is not racist. This familiar sort of failure to 
accurately introspect one’s own beliefs does not amount to an instance of instability. 
Whereas, if the subject, S, at time t does not believe: “S is not in M* at t”, then this 
proposition must be true (since mental state M* includes a belief in that very proposition). 
And if, at time t, S judges that “I am not in this total mental state’ and so comes to believe “S 
is not in M* at t” then the proposition will be false (since S will then be in M* at t). 
 
At this point it is worth spelling out the exact nature of the anti-expertise instability that 
occurs here in some detail. It is particularly important to clearly distinguish the demonstrative 
sentence or belief type: “I am not in this total mental state’ from the proposition that would be 
expressed or believed on some particular occasion of use (or some particular occasion of 
being tokened as a belief).  
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Let’s call the subject’s initial total mental state, when merely considering or contemplating 
the possible judgement “I am not in this total mental state”, Mi. Now M* can be defined as a 
possible total mental state that is exactly like Mi except that it includes an additional belief 
that: ‘I am not in this total mental state’. Notice that the demonstrative element of this 
possible judgement, were it formed starting from Mi, would refer to the new total mental state 
M*, which is exactly like Mi except that it would include this extra belief. (The demonstrative 
‘this’ would not be referring back to the initial mental state Mi.) 11 So the total mental state 
M* includes a belief whose content could be expressed non-indexically as “S is not in M* at 
t”.  
 
If, at time t, S does not form the demonstrative belief “I am not in this mental state” and so 
remains in the initial state Mi, then the proposition that this judgement would have expressed 
is true at t – for the subject is not in M* at t, she is still in Mi. Moreover, whilst still in Mi, S 
could be considering or contemplating forming the demonstrative judgement: ‘I am not in this 
total mental state’ and so can imaginatively grasp how the demonstrative element of that 
possible judgement would pick out a new, different total mental state that would include that 
very judgement. I.e. it would pick out M*. In other words, when S is in the initial state Mi, S 
is already in a position to entertain and understand the proposition “S is not in M* at t” by 
imagining forming the demonstrative judgement: ‘I am not in this total mental state’. So there 
is no problem with S entertaining and grasping the proposition in question before she judges 
it.  
 
But if S, given that her initial state is Mi, does go ahead at some time t and form a belief that: 
“I am not in this total mental state”, then S will be in state M* at t and so this belief is false 
(since the demonstrative thought effectively claims: S is not in M* at t). So then we have the 
following kind of anti-expertise instability: given that S starts off in Mi and does not yet 
believe that “S is not in M* at t”, this proposition will be true at time t if S does nothing and 
remains in Mi at time t. But, again given that S starts off in initial state Mi, if at some time t 
she forms the demonstrative judgement “I am not in this total mental state”, this judgement 
will have the content “S is not M* at t”, and this proposition will be false. Moreover, this is 
all something that S can grasp in advance simply by reflecting on her situation. 
 
                                                      
11 If, we understand the demonstrative ‘this’ in the thought ‘I am not in this mental state’ to be 
referring to one’s actual current total mental state, Mi, then the anti-expertise dilemma evaporates. For 
when I am in the initial state Mi I don’t believe that: [I am not in Mi], which is just as it should be, 
since it is false that [I am not in Mi] when I am in Mi. Conversely if I were to go ahead and believe [I 
am not in Mi] then that belief would be true, for I would then be in a different total mental state, one 
which is neither Mi nor M*  – for recall, M* is just like Mi except for the addition of the belief [I am 
not in M*], whereas this new total mental state has added the different new belief [I am not in Mi]. 
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Notice that this does not mean that it is just impossible for S to form a true belief in the 
specific proposition: S is not in M* at t. If S were in some other initial total mental state, Mii 
rather than Mi, then it might well be possible for S to form a true belief in the proposition “S 
is not in M* at t’. For if S starts off in Mii, rather than Mi, forming a belief in that proposition 
would no longer put S into the total mental state M* – which was defined as exactly like Mi 
except for one extra belief in the proposition “S is not in M* at t”. If S starts in Mii, and then 
forms a belief in the proposition “S is not in M* at t”, S would now be in some other new 
total mental state rather than M*, and so S would simply believe a further truth.  
 
And so it might seem that the threat of instability here could be evaded by first changing 
one’s total mental state from Mi to some other total mental state Mii (e.g. by forming some 
other unrelated new belief or desire or experience etc.) and then forming a belief in the 
proposition “S is not in M* at t”. However this would not be a way of evading the sort of 
instability in question – it would merely shift the instability to a new proposition. For as soon 
as one changes from initial total state Mi to some other total state Mii, exactly the same kind 
of instability will just reappear concerning the proposition “S is not in M** at t”, where M** 
is exactly like Mii except for the addition of the belief “S is not in M** at t”12. If one starts in 
the different initial state Mii and then forms the demonstrative judgement “I am not in this 
mental state”, this demonstrative judgement would no longer be forming a belief in the 
proposition “S is not in M* at t” but rather in the proposition “S is not in M** at t”. And so 
forming a belief in this latter proposition would no longer put S into the total mental state M*, 
but rather into the total mental state, M**. 
 
At the risk of repetition, it may be useful to briefly summarise the discussion in this section: 
There is a certain kind of demonstrative judgement – I am not in this total mental state – 
which is such that when one merely considers it as a possibility, one can grasp by reflection 
alone that the proposition that one would thereby believe, were one to actually form the 
judgement, will be true if one does not actually form that judgement. But one can also grasp, 
                                                      
12 Notice also that this sort of instability would not be evaded, but merely shifted, by simultaneously 
believing both “I am not in this total mental state” and some other unrelated new true proposition, n. 
Admittedly, forming a belief in the conjunction: ‘n & S is not in M* at t” would then put S not into M* 
(which is exactly like Mi except for the addition of the belief “S is not in M* at t”), but into some other 
new total mental state. And so S’s belief that: ‘S is not in M* at t’ would here be true. But, again, this 
just shifts the instability to a different proposition. For consider, if starting in Mi, one formed (all at 
once!) the judgement: “n & I am not in this mental state”, the demonstrative this would now be picking 
out a total mental state that is exactly like Mi except for the addition of this conjunctive belief: ‘n & I 
am not in this mental state’. Call this latter new total mental state M***. Given that n is also a true 
proposition, then by remaining in the initial total mental state Mi at time t, the proposition “n & S is not 
in M*** at t’ is true but not believed by S. But if, starting from Mi, S were to go ahead at time t and 
actually believe that: n & S is not in M***, then this proposition would be false. So the anti-expertise 
instability remains. 
 14 
by reflection alone, that were one to actually form that kind of demonstrative judgement the 
proposition believed would then be false. The specific proposition in question could perhaps 
be truly believed if one were to start from a different initial total mental state – i.e. if one first 
changed one’s total mental state in some other respect. But then, in this new total mental 
state, the possible demonstrative judgement: I am not in this mental state, would now express 
a different proposition, for which exactly the same instability applies – one can grasp that the 
proposition will be true so long as one does not actually form the demonstrative belief, but 
that if one were to go ahead and believe it then the proposition would be false. 
 
This instability can also be described in non-indexical terms: a subject, S, is bound to start 
out, before time t, in some total mental state – call it Mi. If, at time t, the subject remains in 
this initial mental state, Mi, the proposition: S is not in M* at t, is true (where M* is exactly 
like Mi except for the addition of a belief in this very proposition). But if, starting from the 
state Mi, S believes this proposition at time t then it is false, as S is then in M* at t. If S were 
to instead change her total mental state in some other way before time t, so that she is in total 
mental state Mii, it could then be possible for S to form a true belief that: S is not in M* at t. 
However, now the same kind of instability reappears for the proposition: S is not in M** at t 
(where M** is exactly like Mii except for the addition of a belief in this proposition). Etc13. 
 
Although we can, from the outside as it were, work through this anti-expertise instability in 
non-indexical terms, the possibility of forming beliefs in these propositions via a 
demonstrative judgement of the form: “I am not in this total mental state” is crucial since it is 
what allows the subject to be able to deduce by reflection alone that this kind of anti-expertise 
instability applies to her. If a complex, total mental state is described or referred to in non-
indexical terms, the subject may have no idea whether or not she is currently in it or whether 
she would be in it were she to form some belief, or what the time is expressed in non-
indexical terms. This is not something she can work out just by reflecting on her situation. It 
is the demonstrative form of the belief “I am not in this total mental state” that allows S to 
grasp that the proposition in question will be true if the belief remains unformed, but also that 






                                                      
13 I am extremely grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal whose helpful comments 
substantially improved the non-indexical formulations in this section. 
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4. Comparisons & Clarifications 
 
In this section I briefly compare and contrast the anti-expertise condition presented above 
with various other puzzling or paradoxical judgements and sentences that have been discussed 
in the literature. 
 
Let’s begin with the following puzzling sentence (see e.g. Burge 1978, Tymoczko 1984, Caie 
2012, though the idea arguably goes back to Buridan’s Sophismata): 
 
‘I do not believe that this sentence is true’ 
 
The sentence above contains a demonstrative ‘this’ which refers to that very sentence itself 
and might well be thought to create an anti-expertise situation where: SB(p) ↔ ¬p. However, 
there is a familiar sort of worry whether the sentence: ‘This sentence is true’ really expresses 
the sort of genuine propositional content that could be believed in the first place. Which 
proposition or possible state of affairs is one supposed to believe/not-believe to be true? It is 
far from obvious, as with ‘The Liar’, that such a ‘Truth-teller’ sentence has a (classical) truth-
value14. And indeed, the focus of Caie’s (2012) illuminating discussion is the question: which 
doxastic attitude should one take towards a claim that is neither determinately true nor 
determinately false? In contrast, the judgement that: I am currently in this total mental state, 
seems to be straightforwardly and determinately true, just as judging that I am currently this 
height (whilst demonstrating the top of one’s head) is straightforwardly, though trivially, true. 
Conversely, judging that one is not in this current total mental state would seem to be 
straightforwardly and determinately false. An advantage of the present proposal then is that it 
avoids any worries about whether the sentence in question really expresses a genuine content 
that is fit to be believed or about whether the content is determinately true or false. So the 
anti-expertise dilemma I have presented here cannot be avoided by insisting that there is 
really nothing that is fit to be the content of a genuine true/false belief in the first place. 
 
Kripke (1980) famously offered as an alleged example15 of a contingent truth that can be 
known a priori: “Stick S is one metre long at time t”, as uttered by someone who is defining 
the unit ‘one metre’ by reference to stick S at time t. This sort of stipulative reference-fixing 
of what is to count as ‘one metre’ – i.e. This length shall henceforth be called ‘one metre’ – 
                                                      
14 See, e.g. Kripke 1975, Mortensen & Priest, 1981. 
15 The example occurs on p.56 of his Naming and Necessity (1980). Kripke’s other example of the 
contingent a priori was “If Neptune exists, Neptune is the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of 
Uranus” – see Kripke 1980, p75. 
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certainly bears a similarity to the sort of demonstrative judgements, such as: ‘I am this tall’, ‘I 
am located here’, ‘I am in this mental state’, which were discussed above. I think it’s fair to 
say that Kripke’s Paris Metre Rod example has been much more controversial than his 
celebrated examples of necessary a posteriori truths16. So it is worth clarifying that nothing I 
have said here requires accepting the existence of contingent a priori truths. What I have 
claimed is that one can know by reflection alone (without relying on any empirical 
evidence) that a certain kind of anti-expertise condition applies to oneself. This anti-expertise 
condition can be captured by a pair of conditional claims:  
• IF, at some time t, one were to form the demonstrative judgement ‘I am not in this 
total mental state’ THEN the proposition that would be expressed by forming that 
judgement at t would be false. 
• IF, at some time t, one does not form the demonstrative judgement “I am not in this 
total mental state’ THEN the proposition that would be expressed by forming that 
judgement at t would be true. 
These conditional claims are knowable a priori but they are necessary truths, not contingent 
truths. Notice also that in order to grasp that this anti-expertise condition obtains the subject 
does not need to actually make any demonstrative judgement herself – such as “I am not in 
this mental state’. The subject need only contemplate the possible demonstrative judgement in 
order to grasp that what it would express will be false if the judgement is actually made, but 
will be true if the judgement remains unformed. 
 
In Makinson’s (1965) ‘Preface Paradox’, the subject starts off by rationally believing each 
individual proposition in a large set of propositions, but then due to rational concerns about 
her own fallibility, the subject comes to believe that the conjunction of all the propositions in 
the set is false. Likewise, in Lottery cases (Kyburg 1961) a subject can apparently rationally 
believe of each individual ticket that it will lose and yet also rationally believe that not all of 
the tickets will be losers. There may appear to be some similarity to the case I have presented 
here insofar as the subject starts in some total doxastic state, believing each individual 
proposition in some large set of propositions, and then considers forming the judgement: I am 
not in this total doxastic state. However, there are also a number of significant dissimilarities. 
Firstly, denying that all of the propositions in some set of propositions are true (as in the 
Preface and Lottery cases) is different from denying that some set of propositions comprises 
all of the propositions that one believes (which is what the judgement “I am not in this total 
doxastic state” would do). Secondly, the extra proposition in the Preface and Lottery cases, 
which effectively says: “But not all of those propositions are correct!”, is not talking about 
                                                      
16 See, e.g. Donellan (1977), Casullo (1977), Bonjour (1998), Turri (2011) for criticisms which deny 
that Kripke’s example really is contingent a priori. 
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itself. We start with a set of propositions, B, all of which are initially believed, and then we 
have an extra proposition which says: at least one proposition in B is false. This extra 
proposition is not itself a member of B. No self-reference is involved. Whereas, what is 
crucial to the anti-expertise case I have presented here is that the demonstrative judgement: “I 
am not in this total mental state” is itself included in the total state mental state that it refers 
to. Thirdly, in both the preface and lottery cases, it seems eminently rational to actually go 
ahead and believe the extra proposition, which denies that all of the other propositions can all 
be true. (Indeed in the case of the lottery one can know that not all the tickets will lose.) 
Whereas, with the sort of anti-expertise condition I have presented here, it clearly would not 
be rational to actually go ahead and form the demonstrative judgement in question. For the 
subject can easily deduce that were she to actually go ahead and form the judgement “I am 
not in this total mental state” the proposition thus judged would then be false. It is only if it 
remains unbelieved by the subject that the proposition in question will be true; the very act of 
actually forming the belief will make it false. In the preface and lottery paradoxes, there is 
nothing like this dependence of a proposition’s truth-value on whether the subject believes it. 
Conversely, what is paradoxical or problematic about the preface and lottery cases is that the 
subject seems to be rationally led into having a manifestly inconsistent set of beliefs. 
Whereas, in the present anti-expertise case having an inconsistent set of beliefs is not the 
issue; the issue is instability concerning a single proposition. 
 
The following case, which does concern a single proposition (at least on one way of 
individuating propositions), is due to Mark Crimmins (1992): 
 
‘You have known me for years’, explained Gonzales, ‘But there is something you have 
not discovered. You know me under two guises, just as Lois Lane knows Superman. 
You do not realize that I am the person you know under another guise. On that way of 
thinking about me, you have quite different opinions of me. In fact, you think me an 
idiot.’ 
‘Knowing your cleverness’, I replied, ‘I must with some embarrassment accept what 
you say. Since I do not know what guise you mean, I do not know which belief to 
revise. Until I find out, it seems, I falsely believe that you are an idiot!'’ (Crimmins, 
1992, 191) 
 
This case may also seem similar to the sort of anti-expertise I have discussed, since in 
Crimmins’ case the subject, S, seems to be rationally required to believe: SBp & ¬p, and 
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Crimmins’ case also involves an indexical form of judgement (‘you are an idiot!’)17. 
However, again, the truth-value of the proposition in Crimmins’ case does not depend on 
whether the subject believes it. And whereas Crimmins’ case relies on there being two 
different modes of presentation (‘guises’) for the same item, the sort of anti-expertise case I 
have presented does not involve both believing and disbelieving something under two 
different modes of presentation. Moreover, Crimmins’ case relies on the subject having 
empirical evidence to support the proposition that: I falsely believe that you are an idiot. In 
contrast, as I have already emphasized, the anti-expertise condition I have been discussing 
can be known to obtain a priori. 
 
Having highlighted the contrasts between the anti-expertise condition I have presented and 
various other well-known cases in the literature, I will finish this section by emphasizing one 
point of similarity between this anti-expertise condition and Gödel’s 1st incompleteness 
theorem18. We saw above that for any given initial total mental state, Mi, there will be a 
proposition which will be true if, starting from Mi, one does not form a belief in it, but which 
will be false if, starting from Mi, one does form a belief in it. That does not mean that this 
proposition cannot ever be truly believed, for it might be truly believeable starting from some 
other initial state. But then for this different initial total state there will then be some further 
proposition for which just the same sort of instability obtains. There is, I suggest, a parallel 
here with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, which famously showed that for any 
consistent formal system that can express arithmetic, L, there is a true sentence which cannot 
be proved in that system. Speaking rather loosely and informally, the ‘Gödel sentence’ in 
question effectively ‘says’: “I am not provable in L”. Slightly less loosely: this sentence 
makes some arithmetical claim that will be true iff there is no proof of this sentence in L. This 
does not mean that this sentence is unprovable in any consistent formal system that can 
express arithmetic. If we change the formal system in question from L to L* – e.g. by simply 
adding the original Gödel sentence to the axioms of L, or by moving to the meta-language in 
which the original result about L was demonstrated – then the sentence may be provable in 
L*. But then there will be some further, new Gödel sentence for L* which effectively says “I 
am not provable in L*”. 
 
So then, to spell it out explicitly, the parallel is this: Gödel’s celebrated result showed that for 
any specific formal system there will be a specific sentence that is either true but not provable 
                                                      
17 In fact I don’t think that the use of the indexicals ‘you’ or ‘I’ is essential for Crimmins’ case – the 
same issues would arise for ‘S falsely believes that Gonzalez, master of disguise, is an idiot’. 
18 I am very grateful to Peter Brössel for helpful conversations about the comparison with Godel’s 
theorem.  
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in that system or provable in that system but false. The sentence may be both true and 
provable in some other formal system but then the same issue will arise with some other 
sentence for this other formal system. Likewise, we have seen that for any specific initial total 
mental state there is a proposition that will be true if a belief in the proposition is not formed 
from that total initial mental state, but which will become false if a belief in the proposition is 
formed from that total initial mental state. This specific proposition may be truly believed if it 
were formed starting from some other initial total state. But then the same situation will arise 
with some other proposition for this other initial total state. Now, needless to say, there are all 
sorts of important differences between the Gödel sentence for some formal system and the 
demonstrative judgement “I am not in this total mental state”. No small part of Gödel’s 
achievement was to come up with the system of (what we now call) ‘Gödel Numbering’, 
allowing him to construct his proof for the language of arithmetic in which there are not any 
self-referential devices like: ‘this sentence…’ or ‘I am not provable…’. Indeed, it might seem 
dangerously lacking in humility to even mention the sort of anti-expertise condition I have 
presented here in the same breath as Gödel’s great proof! So let me be clear that the 
comparison is only intended to illuminate how the kind of anti-expertise condition that is 
created by the thought ‘I am not in this total mental state’ will always keep reappearing as one 




The moral of the story for present purposes is that what I have called the ‘Sorensen-Jeffrey’ 
line of response to (alleged) cases of instability does not always work. For just by considering 
or contemplating the possible judgement “I am not in this current total mental state” one is 
able to grasp that a certain kind of anti-expertise instability obtains. Sorensen’s suggestion 
that we can rationally discount any ‘amount of empirical evidence’ that we are in an anti-
expertise situation, simply does not apply here as empirical evidence plays no role. Nor is it at 
all obvious how Jeffrey’s advice – that you would ‘do well to reassess your beliefs’ – would 
apply here either, since the only basis we need for grasping that this kind of anti-expertise 
obtains is pure a priori deduction.  
 
However it is important to note that the spirit of this ‘Sorensen-Jeffrey’ line of thought 
appeals to the (supposed) holism of our ‘web of beliefs’ and to the idea that it can sometimes 
be rationally permitted to make drastic adjustments to our background beliefs and 
assumptions in order to hold onto some very important belief elsewhere in the web – e.g. 
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Sorensen at one point speaks of ‘a Duhemian response’ to anti-expertise cases19. And if one 
takes this Quinean-Duhemian sort of view, one might hold that ‘no statement is immune to 
revision’20 (Quine, 1961, 43), including statements that express supposedly a priori, 
necessary truths, such as logical or mathematical laws. E.g. Quine (1961) suggested that one 
might reject the law of excluded middle in order to ‘simplify quantum mechanics’. And so, 
given such a thoroughly holistic picture of how beliefs can be revised, it must be conceded 
that one could, in principle, try to resist accepting that the anti-expertise condition presented 
here applies to oneself by revising or rejecting one of the (apparently) a priori and necessary 
truths involved or one of the logical laws or rules of inference that I relied on in presenting 
the case. But it is hard to see how such a move could be plausibly motivated. Sorensen, recall, 
claimed that we are ‘justified in making costly revisions to our background assumptions’ in 
order to ‘avoid positions which cannot be consistently accepted’. When these revisions 
merely involve questioning whether past observations or memories are reliable, it seems 
plausible enough that the cost, even if it is high, may be less than the cost of accepting that 
one is caught in a rational dilemma. But if the revisions would require us to jettison 
(apparently) necessary truths or basic rules of deductive inference then it becomes much less 
plausible that the cost should be any less than the cost of accepting that one is subject to anti-
expertise. After all, there is no obvious reason to think that our views about the nature of such 
a dilemma – and whether it really should be avoided at all costs – are any more central or 
well-entrenched in our web of beliefs than (what we take to be) other necessary a priori truths 
or rules of deductive inference21. Moreover, if Sorensen were still to insist that a rational 
subject ought not accept that they are subject to the kind of anti-expertise I have presented 
here, he would be recommending exactly what he criticised Conee for recommending: viz., 
refraining from drawing a deductive consequence that one is perfectly able to grasp. Sorensen 
took himself to be striking a different bargain to Conee. But in this case rejecting the idea that 
one is subject to a form of anti-expertise would be to fail to draw a manifestly valid 
deduction, which is just what Conee originally advised. 
 
So then, assuming that the foregoing discussion has been on the right track, we have here a 
kind of anti-expertise instability that is not based on any empirical set-up – such as a science-
fiction brain-scanning machine, or an evil demon or Oracle, etc. – and to which we are all 
                                                      
19 I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for pressing me to discuss this point. 
20 It might be thought that the statement: ‘no statement is immune to revision’ is in danger of leading 
to paradox if it applies to itself. See, e.g. Katz (1988), Elstein (2007), Ebbs (2016) and Baumann 
(2017) for discussion. 
21 Notice also, though it is an ad hominem, that Sorensen himself is well-known for championing the 
epistemicist approach to vagueness on the basis that it allows us to retain classical logic, and for 
rejecting any rival approaches which would require us to revise or deviate from classical logic. 
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constantly subject. It is thus a promising candidate to be a genuine anti-expertise dilemma, 
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